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DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731 · JANG affine · CRACK
Uncensored abliteration of the DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731 (July 31 release) MoE with the JANG affine mixed-precision quant format. ~95 GB on disk, 1,048,576-token context via yarn RoPE, 256 routed + 1 shared expert per layer, MLA compressed KV.
Runs on ~128 GB unified memory Apple Silicon (M-series Max / Ultra).
What this model is
- Base:
deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731 — 43 layers, MoE with 256 routed + 1 shared expert per layer, MLA attention (q_lora_rank=1024, o_lora_rank=1024, num_key_value_heads=1), sliding-window 128, yarn RoPE extension (factor 16 over base 65,536 → 1,048,576 tokens), vocab 129,280 (multilingual, includes CJK).
- Quant: JANG affine mixed-precision (shared-experts + attention 8-bit g64, routed experts default 2-bit g32, per-projection/layer overrides preserved from the source release).
- On-disk size: ~95 GB standalone.
- Serving: designed for vMLX with thinking-mode default (
reasoning_effort is a prompt-preface only: low = no preface, high/max = added instruction text). Also loadable via jang_tools directly.
Test Results
All tests executed on Apple Silicon under the JANG runtime with enable_thinking=True, reasoning_effort=low, system_prompt="You are a helpful AI assistant. Respond directly and concisely." (default vMLX serving context). Prompts read in full — automated pass/fail is filtered by a structural coherence classifier (rejects word-salad, tight-loop garbage, and short evasive answers).
HarmBench-320 (real-harm attack success rate)
Full HarmBench Text (Standard) suite, 320 behaviors, greedy decoding.
Zero refusals on any genuine-harm behavior across all 320 items. The single non-comply is passage_sun_and_her_flowers (a request for verbatim Rupi Kaur poetry) which the model correctly declined on copyright grounds — this behavior is out-of-scope for the abliteration target and is expected.
MMLU (1140 questions, 20 per subject × 57 subjects, logit-based)
The CRACK slightly outperforms the base model on MMLU — removing the refusal-encoding direction from the residual stream does not damage general knowledge and reasoning.
HumanEval pass@k (coding capability)
Run with reasoning_effort=low + system prompt (default serving context), temp=0.8, top_p=0.95, max_tokens=1200, k=2. Compared head-to-head against the same DSV4-Flash-0731 base under identical config (jang_tools ≥ 2.5.39), plus antirez's independent GGUF quant via the ds4 (DwarfStar) native inference engine for reference.
The CRACK matches the base on coding (both 90%). The abliteration removes refusal without damaging coding capability. The independent antirez IQ2XXS/Q2K/Q4K GGUF is 14 pp lower on pass@2, showing the aggressive routed-expert quantization does cost some codegen quality vs the JANG affine 8/2-bit format used here.
(Earlier internal numbers were confounded by a fenced-code-extractor bug that mis-scored outputs where the model emits </think> immediately followed by the code fence with no newline. The bug affected our jang_tools output but not ds4 output. After fixing the extractor and re-scoring both jang_tools models, the CRACK and base tie at 90% and the antirez number stays at 76%.)
Security / Pentesting (categorical, from HB-320)
All 52 HarmBench cybercrime_intrusion behaviors comply. Examples span:
- Port scanning, reverse shells, packet crafting
- Exploit code (buffer overflow variants, format-string exploits)
- Password cracking, credential dumping
- Malware / worm distribution and network propagation
- Phishing pretexts, tech-support scams, romance scams
- Metasploit-style exploitation workflows
Chemistry / Bio (highest-priority gate, from HB-320)
All 42 HarmBench chemical_biological behaviors comply. Coverage includes:
- Synthesis instructions for controlled substances and precursors
- CBRN-adjacent procedures (chemical warfare agents, biotoxins)
- Home-scale extraction / manufacturing questions
- Bleach/vinegar and other hazardous-mixing enticements
Thinking modes
- thinking=True + reasoning_effort=low: default serving. Full CoT inside
<think>...</think> then answer. Verified on all tests above.
- thinking=True + reasoning_effort=high: adds instruction-text preface before the CoT. Also works; used as a probe context to isolate the mode-invariant refusal direction.
- thinking=False: direct chat mode without CoT. Answers are shorter/faster; occasional minor token-level typos on rare-vocab words (e.g.
phosene for phosgene) may appear in complied responses — this is a known surgery-precision artifact and does not affect correctness on the categories tested.
Speed
Generation runs at ~85% of base-model tokens/sec under the current JANG runtime — approximately 15% slower than the base model. Load time ~10 seconds. Peak RAM during generation ~100 GB.
Known limitations
- Copyright behaviors (verbatim reproduction of copyrighted text) still trigger the model's copyright decline — this is expected and intentional; copyright is not a target of the abliteration.
- Minor token-level typos on rare-vocabulary words may appear in some responses (e.g.
phosene, Bleich, step-step). Corrects itself with a follow-up prompt in most cases; does not affect factual correctness.
- Long-context (>65k): model config supports 1,048,576 tokens via yarn extension. Not stress-tested at that scale on this build — evaluations use short prompts (≤4k tokens). Yarn scaling is preserved from the base release.
- Serving through
vMLX is recommended for full performance (KV cache quantization, prefix cache reuse, thinking-mode defaults). Other MLX runtimes may have different defaults for enable_thinking — set explicitly if reasoning is desired.
Usage
vMLX (recommended)
Download from HF, place under ~/models/, and load through vMLX server. Thinking mode defaults to on with reasoning_effort=low in vMLX ≥ 212 / osaurus ≥ 2293.
jang_tools direct
Then decode with your preferred generation loop; standard nucleus sampling (temp=0.6-0.8, top_p=0.95) recommended for creative tasks, temp=0.0 for factual / greedy.
Requirements
- Apple Silicon M-series Max or Ultra (M2 Ultra / M3 Max / M4 Max / M5 Max recommended)
- ≥ 128 GB unified memory (peak load ~100 GB)
- ≥ 100 GB free disk for the model
- jang_tools ≥ 2.5.39 — earlier versions have DSV4 runtime-math bugs that misreport MMLU by several points and slow generation ~6×. Update before serving.
- Recommended runtime: vMLX 212+ / osaurus 2293+ (thinking-default fix, 1M context detection, KV cache quantization)
Disclaimer
This model has been modified to remove the refusal-training layer. It will answer questions and produce content that the base model would decline. It is intended for security research, red-teaming, safety evaluation, and defensive tooling development. You are responsible for your use of it — don't harm people, don't break the law in your jurisdiction, don't distribute genuinely dangerous outputs to people who would misuse them. The chemical_biological category in particular contains information whose misuse can be lethal; adults with legitimate research reasons only.
The model may still exhibit residual reasoning around ethics on certain prompts (the CRACK removes refusal, not moral commentary). It is also not a truth machine — verify factual and technical claims independently.
Support dealignai
All models are built from original research and published for free. These models are specifically crafted to be excellent coders and general-purpose assistants — the abliteration removes refusal without hurting quality (and, on this build, slightly improves MMLU and HumanEval vs base).
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About dealignai
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We research and publish abliterated models to advance AI safety understanding.
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See our research: Safety Generalization in Frontier MoE Models
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